Digital Sovereignty Index Reveals New Global Divide in Technological Dominance — and Brazil Is Far from the Top

A ranking created by researchers at UnB and USP evaluated 86 countries based on their ability to manage digital infrastructure, data, artificial intelligence, and information flows. Brazil ranked 48th.

Originally published in The Conversation

By Isabela Rocha-Dashicheva and Laura Beatriz Ludovico

National power today is measured by the ability to control digital infrastructure, data, artificial intelligence, and information flows. Countries that lack this capability become dependent on external technological architectures, making them vulnerable to data extraction, economic pressure, and foreign political influence. Digital sovereignty is sovereignty in its truest sense.

From the struggle to control the digital environment, three distinct models of technological governance have emerged. This is the central finding of the Digital Sovereignty Index (DSI) developed by the BRICS+ Tech Forum, which ranks 86 countries according to their level of Digital Sovereignty. The index was developed by researchers from the University of Brasília (UnB) and the University of São Paulo (USP).

These three models are embodied by China, France, and Russia, which occupy the top three positions in the ranking. China has built an integrated digital ecosystem in which the state, industry, and domestic platforms work in coordination, enabling it to dominate infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and digital governance on a global scale.

The European model, represented by France, relies on governance, data protection, sovereign cloud infrastructure, and regulation to discipline the power of Big Tech companies and assert the European Union's digital sovereignty.

Russia's model, in turn, emerged from the strategic necessity of surviving under sanctions, accelerating technological substitution, strengthening domestic platforms, and reorganizing national digital infrastructure under state coordination.

These represent three distinct paradigms. The first stems from a long-term strategic vision centered on national sovereignty; the second is based on the ability to redirect and regulate digital capitalism through governance; and the third has been shaped by the sovereign reconstruction of digital infrastructure in response to geopolitical pressure, sanctions, and the West's economic and technological containment.

How the Digital Sovereignty Index Works

The Digital Sovereignty Index (DSI) evaluates state capabilities across four dimensions: hardware, software, cognition, and governance. Within each dimension, the index measures different levels of technological capability—from merely using a technology to specifying it, producing it autonomously, and capturing economic value through domestic value chains. The average score across these four dimensions generates an overall rating on a scale from 0 to 100.

The map produced by the index systematically confirms what has long been apparent: technological dominance remains concentrated in the Global North and among the world's major industrial powers, largely reproducing historical hierarchies within the international system.

China: The Dragon in the Room

China ranks first in the DSI with a score of 98.43. It falls short of a perfect score only because it does not yet fully dominate advanced semiconductor manufacturing. China has built an integrated model linking the state, industry, infrastructure, and strategic planning, achieving the highest possible scores in Software, Cognition, and Governance, according to the study's preprint.

In practice, this means China is capable of coordinating entire technological ecosystems. In hardware, the Chinese state directly oversees the expansion of telecommunications networks, backbone infrastructure, 5G deployment, and large-scale nationally distributed data center projects.

In software, while much of the world depends on American platforms, China has developed a comprehensive and self-sufficient digital ecosystem. Services such as Huawei Cloud, Tencent, and WeChat have become extensions of China's own strategic infrastructure.

Following repeated controversies involving surveillance, algorithmic manipulation, and the geopolitical use of Western digital platforms, the Great Firewall has increasingly been viewed by Chinese policymakers as an instrument of strategic protection.

China's cognitive dimension further reinforces this model. Five-Year Plans, national AI strategies, and massive investments in technical education demonstrate a state capable of aligning education, research, industry, and strategic planning around long-term national objectives.

The Chinese government also maintains the effective ability to regulate digital platforms, control data flows, and restructure entire markets whenever deemed strategically necessary—an increasingly rare capability among major powers.

France and the European Model

France ranks second with a score of 92.18. Unlike China, however, France's digital strength does not arise from an integrated industrial model, but from Europe's ability to subordinate digital infrastructure to strategic governance.

The European approach rests on a simple principle: whoever sets the rules of the digital environment exercises power over it. Through the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European Union compelled Big Tech companies to adapt their systems, contracts, and data practices to European rules, transforming regulation into an instrument of digital sovereignty.

Europe recognized early that, in a world where much of the internet's physical infrastructure was already concentrated in American companies, sovereignty could also be asserted through the ability to impose regulatory frameworks beyond U.S. jurisdiction.

In practice, Europe has demonstrated that digital governance itself generates power. France leads this model through sovereign cloud initiatives, cybersecurity, and digital regulation, compelling international companies to adapt to the European regulatory framework.

Russia's Resilience Under Sanctions

Russia ranks third with a score of 89.06, challenging expectations that economic sanctions and technological isolation would produce irreversible digital decline. Instead, the DSI suggests the opposite: sanctions accelerated technological substitution, strengthened state coordination, and promoted the sovereign reorganization of Russia's digital infrastructure.

Russia has consolidated a domestic digital architecture capable of sustaining connectivity, governance, and critical infrastructure despite external pressure. Although it continues to face limitations in advanced semiconductors, it has partially compensated through state coordination, regulatory adaptation, and the expansion of domestic software ecosystems.

In software, the Russian government has promoted national operating systems, official registries of domestic software, and compatibility requirements for public institutions and strategic enterprises.

Russia also performs strongly in the cognitive dimension. The country maintains a longstanding tradition of excellence in mathematics, advanced technical education, and strategic research in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and information sovereignty. Official Russian discourse increasingly frames technology as a matter of national survival, a perspective clearly reflected in the index.

The United States and the Limits of Corporate Power

The United States ranks fourth with a score of 87.50. According to the DSI, this is not due to technological weakness but rather to limitations in state sovereignty over the country's own technology giants.

Although the United States remains an almost uncontested superpower in hardware and software, the DSI measures more than technological capability—it measures sovereignty. Sovereignty requires the state's ability to discipline powerful economic actors, and it is precisely in this dimension that the U.S. scores lower than China, France, and Russia.

Washington continues to operate within a model in which Big Tech companies function as relatively autonomous centers of political, economic, and informational power. While these corporations generally align with broader American strategic interests, the absence of comprehensive federal data protection legislation and the limited ability to impose structural constraints on digital platforms reduce the country's governance score.

The paradox is striking: the United States possesses perhaps the world's most powerful technological ecosystem, yet much of that capacity resides within private corporations rather than the state itself. In many cases, Washington relies on Big Tech companies to project digital geopolitical influence while demonstrating only limited legal authority to fully subordinate them to public strategic objectives.

BRICS and the Global South

The sharpest contrast revealed by the DSI lies in the longstanding divide between the Global North and the Global South. Much of Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia remains dependent on foreign technological infrastructure. These countries may have internet access, digital banking, e-government services, mobile connectivity, and widespread use of digital platforms, yet they lack effective control over the infrastructure underpinning their digital economies.

Brazil scores 57.8, tying with Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 48th place overall. Despite its large domestic market, scientific production, and institutional capacity, Brazil continues to depend heavily on foreign digital infrastructure.

Within the BRICS grouping, China and Russia emerge as poles of sovereign technological organization, while India (75) stands as an intermediate power with strong software capabilities and expanding industrial capacity. Brazil and South Africa (56.25) remain considerably more vulnerable to technological dependence.

In this sense, the colonialism of the past reappears in a new form—not primarily through the control of territory or natural resources, but through control over data, information infrastructure, and technological architecture.

China, France, and Russia represent three distinct responses to this new contest for power—through industrial policy, governance, or the sovereign reconstruction of digital infrastructure. Despite their differences, all three models point toward the same conclusion: in the twenty-first century, Digital Sovereignty is no longer merely a strategic option—it has become a fundamental condition for national survival.