Brazil as a Stronghold for Rare Earths

Defending sovereignty over mineral resources is a strategic issue of the highest order

Originally published in Le Monde Diplomatique

By Matheus Pereira

In the underground, contemporary geopolitical dispute is measured, beyond the obvious sovereignty of territory, by the capacity to control the flows of matter that sustain industry, defense, and the very architecture of technological power, since it is not the possession of the resource that defines autonomy, but the mastery over its transformation, circulation, and strategic use. And this is where one of the most important political agendas of our time lies: defining what captures value, who controls the critical stages of the productive chain, and, ultimately, what decides the strategic destiny that sustains the 21st century. This is because the contemporary geopolitical landscape is marked by the energy transition and the intensification of technological competition. The so-called Rare Earth Elements, a set of seventeen critical metals, assume a central role and are often considered the petroleum of the 21st century. Essential for the production of guided missiles, satellites, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced communication systems, these resources determine the industrial and military autonomy of nations. In a context where digitalization is synonymous with socialization, control over these inputs ceases to be merely an industrial issue and comes to structure the conditions for organizing collective life, the circulation of information, and the capacity for political intervention in the contemporary world.

Contrary to the narrative disseminated by some strategic sectors in the United States, which suggests a natural hegemony in this field, Brazil occupies an unavoidable prominent position. Data from the United States Geological Survey and the National Mining Agency indicate that the country possesses the second largest rare earth reserve in the world, with approximately 21 million metric tons of contained oxides, second only to China, which holds approximately 44 million tons. However, bolder numbers present a volume of approximately 95 million tons in the Araxá deposit alone.

The Araxá deposit, for example, exploited by Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração, is already globally recognized for its production of niobium, a resource of which Brazil holds the majority of global reserves. The association between niobium and rare earths reinforces the country's strategic position in the supply chain of materials essential for high-performance metallurgy, granting Brazil a central role in the supply of these inputs.

This relevance is not limited to volume, but also involves the quality of the reserves and their strategic location: while the United States faces limitations in its reserves and depends on complex and environmentally problematic logistics and refining chains, Brazil possesses a geological heritage concentrated in regions such as the previously mentioned Araxá Massif in Minas Gerais, but also the Goiás Tin Province and the significant potential of the Calha Norte project region in the Amazon.

© Sigma Lithium/Disclosure

Historically, the United States has treated Latin America as a zone of extractivist interest, and Brazil is no exception to this logic. Proclaimed in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine asserted that the American continent should remain under US influence, warding off European interventions. Today, it resurfaces in new forms, often disguised as trade partnerships or security agreements. However, from this perspective, Brazil is often seen not as a strategic partner, but as a supplier of raw materials and a potential competitor to be contained.

The creation of initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership highlights the attempt to organize and influence the global critical minerals market, establishing extraction and commercialization guidelines. The White House, for instance, recently declared that external dependence, especially at the processing stage, constitutes a direct vulnerability to US national security, as strategic sectors such as defense, energy, and telecommunications become exposed to disruption risks. In response, Washington has articulated "agreements" with countries such as Brazil, aiming to secure a monopoly over the supply chains of these resources. In this arrangement, there is a risk that Brazil will be inserted as a mere exporter of inputs, without significant participation in the higher value-added stages of the productive chain. The exchange is clear: securing US infrastructure has as its direct cost the future of our country, as we replace the possibility of building our own industrial chain with a subordinate insertion as input suppliers, displacing the higher value-added stages—and with them, the capacity to decide on the strategic use of these resources—to abroad.

This is the interest of Flávio Bolsonaro, candidate for the presidency of the Republic in the 2026 elections. At the Conservative Political Action Conference, he acknowledged that Brazil would be the solution for the United States to continue having rare earth minerals, and that these resources would be central to maintaining their technological and military superiority. Flávio naturalizes the country's subordinate insertion into a productive chain defined externally, while rejecting any project of mineral sovereignty that articulates internal industrial development and strategic control over these resources.

Despite these subordinate sectors, the country has advanced in the process of industrial verticalization, seeking to overcome the traditional model of raw ore exports. Projects such as those developed, for example, by Mineração Serra Verde, in Minaçu (GO), and by international companies operating in Brazil, indicate a concrete movement towards domestic refining and industrialization of rare earths, which strengthens national economic and technological sovereignty. Serra Verde, in this case, already operates on a commercial scale, producing rare earth concentrates from ionic clays, incorporating beneficiation and initial separation stages of these elements within the territory itself. And, although the final product is, for now, a concentrate (and not fully refined rare earths), the project represents a significant inflection, by internalizing part of the productive chain and reducing exclusive dependence on raw ore exports, while at the same time positioning Brazil as an active supplier in strategic markets outside the Asian axis.

In view of this panorama, the defense of sovereignty over mineral resources becomes a strategic issue of the highest order. The Federal Constitution ensures that subsoil resources belong to the Union, which reinforces the need for policies that guarantee national control over their exploitation. International experience shows that countries that dominate critical stages of the productive chain, such as refining, possess greater capacity to influence the global market.

It is up to Brazil to establish clear guidelines that prevent unfavorable contractual practices, external pressures, or any form of interference that compromises its strategic interests. The management of these resources must be aligned with internal industrial development, technological innovation, and the generation of added value within the national territory itself. To relinquish this control goes beyond losing money, or renouncing some type of economic advantage. It is to consent to marginalization in the system of power that today defines the 21st century.

Matheus Pereira is a Chemical Engineer (ESE-FOC), postgraduate in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (SPbGU), Ambassador of Nuclear Education in Russia (RNEA), and member of the Civil Committee for the Resumption of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (CRPN).